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CONFLICTS-DIVORCE: IS AN ACTION FOR JUDICIAL
SEPARATION IN REM OR IN PERSONAM?
A state of hopeless variance among the different jurisdictions
exists in relation to the important question whether judicial separa-
tion is an action in rem or one in personam. The dictionary definition
of judicial separation states that it is: "A form of legal separation of
man and wife. It answers to and in Great Britain and most states
has the same effect as the separation a mensa et thoro."' The most
important effect of the action, whether it is in rem or in personam,
is that the husband and wife are absolved from the mutual duties of
living together. Under the ecclesiastical law, limited divorce did not
end the marriage and such a decree of separation could be given by
a court where they were merely resident, the court not requiring
domicile. At that time the marriage status did not seem greatly af-
fected by the divorce and the presence of the parties before the court
was the only necessary requirement in order to grant the decree.
This gave judicial separation the connotation of an action in
personam. Today however, limited divorce law does not follow the
ecclesiastical law but is almost entirely statutory. Vernier says:
"The ecclesiastical law was not taken over by the
various states, and has never been in force here, save
by special statute. The courts of the common law or
equity never granted divorce from bed and board
Thus, express statutory authority is essential to the
power to grant divorce from bed and board."3
It seems that today the tendency of the statutes is to make the pro-
ceeding one which is in rem, as will be shown later.
One of the greatest necessities for resolving the conflict is to gain
uniformity in the decisions as to whether the decree has extra terri-
torial validity when rendered on constructive service.
As the law stands today a person may be judicially separated
in one state and the marriage may be completely unaffected in
another. This is true because when a limited divorce is granted under
the theory of a jurisdiction which holds that the action is in rem, if
the court has jurisdiction over the res and the petitioner is domiciled
in the state even if the defendant is a non-appearing non-resident
the court may pronounce a decree entitled to universal recognition.
However, in jurisdictions where the proceeding is considered one
'WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d. ed. 1944) 1344.
2 GOODRICH, CONFLICTS .Or LAWS (1927) Sec. 129.
'2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1932) Sec. 114.
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rn personam a court would not necessarily recognize such a decree
because of the lack of personal service.4
Uniformity seems desirable to prevent such a paradox, and the
rn rem view will promote consistency in the law by sister-states'
recognition. It may be argued that the fact that a person is judicially
separated in one state and yet the marriage is unaffected in another
can have no serious results. The pressing problems of legitimacy,
bigamy and adultery which may arise if an absolute divorce decree
is not recognized by sister-states, are not presented by the non-
recognition of a judicial separation decree by another state, because
under a decree a mensa et thoro neither party is permitted to marry
another person so that doubt will not arise as to whether the second
marriage is valid. However, it is not debatable that serious problems
concerning property rights such as dower, curtesy, and right to sup-
port do arise.
Although the in rem view will promote uniformity, it is advisable
to evaluate the conflicting views. Uniformity must not be gamed by
unreasonable and far-fetched premising. If judicial separation results
fundamentally and primarily in a mere permissive living apart-so
revocable that the parties can almost at will expunge the whole
thing-then what cogency is there in giving it the full effect of
an action in rem? If, on the other hand, it is an action which destroys
the incidental personal and property rights and the obligations aris-
ing out of the marital status, thereby substantially affecting the res,
there is little doubt that it should be treated similarly to the action of
absolute divorce which is generally held to be an action in rem.
In presenting the cases supporting the in personam view our
foremost authority is the famous case of Pettis v. Pettis. The Con-
necticut court in this case refused to recognize a New York decree of
divorce a mensa et thoro against a non-appearing non-resident hus-
band who resided in Connecticut, holding that a divorce a mensa et
thoro does not affect status and is purely personal. In its opinion the
court stated, "Independently of authority a decree that simply
creates a terminable abnormal relation between husband and wife
cannot be said to affect the underlying marital status."'G
Some of the cases which seem to support the in personam view,
point out that a divorce a mensa et thoro or judicial separation does
not nullify the marriage bond but only allows the parties to live
apart. Reconciliation alone is often enough to put an end to the
'See: STUMBERG, CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1937) 291.
'91 Conn. 608, 101 Atl. 13 (1917)
'Pettis v Pettis. 91 Conn. 608, 101 Atl. 13, 17 (1917).
Freeman v Belfer, 173 N.C. 581, 92 S.E. 486 (1917), Supreme
Council American Legion of Honor v Smith, 45 N.J. 466, 17 Atl. 770
(1889)
STUDENT NOTES AND COMIENTS
judgment.' Sometimes the judgment for judicial separation serves
as a basis for an absolute divorce at the end of a year if the parties
are not reconciled, but even in this case, it is stated that twelve
months grace is to avoid the necessity of completely dissolving the
marriage tie.' The duty to support and maintain tontinues ox the
part of the husband. His duty is to provide his wife with sufficient
support considering his circumstances and her needs. The wife can
not as a femme sole maintain an action at law against her husband
even though she had such a divorce.' 1 It has been held that the hus-
band is entitled to curtesy after a divorce a mensa et thoro, and the
wife to dower, as though there had been no divorce; and on the death
of the husband, the wife may claim her distributive share of his
personal estate if he dies intestate."-
It seems also important to note that divorce a mensa et thoro, in
some states, will be granted on grounds insufficient to authorize the
in rem action of absolute divorce." It is plainly stated in many of the
cases that the proceeding for judicial separation depending on dif-
ferent statutes from that of absolute divorce is an entirely different
action." These results flow naturally from the historical fact that
originally judicial separation did not affect the marriage status to
any great extent, because the action was allowed at a time when
the sacramental nature of marriage was recognized and there was no
action for absolute divorce.'5
In summation of this side of the question, it would seem that
the decree merely affects the reciprocal rights and duties of cohabi-
tation without affecting the marital relation materially in any other
way. It is of course argued that the right to and the duty of cohabita-
tion are substantially the essence of the marital status. However, in
jurisdictions taking the view that reconciliation is enough to put an
end to the judgment, it seems that the right of cohabitation is merely
suspended and not destroyed. The fact that such a divorce differs by
statute from absolute divorce, and is of the two the less destructive
is an additional reason for calling it an in personam action. It seems
reasonable to believe that one applying for judicial separation in a
state where absolute divorce is also granted desires something less
'in re Rudolph's Estate, 128 Pa. Super. 459, 194 Atl. 311 (1937)
See: Miller v Clark, 23 Ind. 370, 373 (1864)
'See: State ex rel. Stuart v Ellis, 50 La. Ann. 559, 23 So. 445
(1898)
"See: Gloth v Gloth, 154 Va. 511, 153 S.E. 879, 887 (1930)
"Drum v Drum, 69 N.J. 557, 55 Atl. 86 (1889).
il-See: Supreme Council American Legion of Honor v. Smith, 45
N.J. 466, 17 Atl. 770, 771 (1889).
"McClintock v. McClintock, 147 Ky 409, 144 S.W 68, 72 (1912).
"Stewart v Stewart, 105 Md. 297, 66 Ati. 16, 17 (1907) Schwab
v Schwab, 93 Md. 385, 49 Atl. 331 (1901).
'"Pettis v. Pettis, 91 Conn. 608, 101 Ati. 13 (1917).
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than complete separation of marriage ties, whether this be a reli-
gious or a social wish.
The attack of those who argue that an action for divorce a mensa
et thoro is an action in rem must necessarily begin with an agreement
as to.the definition of the marital status or res. It is, of course, not a
physical thing but rather a position m society plus certain definite
rights. These are personal rights, mainly that of consortium, and
property rights. Whether it is an in rem action or not seems more or
less a problem of how complete is the destruction of these rights.
The Supreme Court of the United States seems to give full sup-
port to the in rem view in Thompson v. Thompson." This case holds
that a decree for judicial separation granted at the matrimomal
domicile on constructive service is entitled to full faith and credit.
The trend of the statutes seems to give the limited divorce the
wider effects of the absolute divorce. Statutes in this country often
provide the same requirements for limited as for absolute divorce
both as to requirements for bringing the suit and as to procedure
It is provided by statute that the decree will operate as a decree for
a divorce from the bonds of matrimony except that neither party
may marry again during the life of the other."
8 Examples of other
extensive effects of the statutes are as follows: in Georgia the wife
becomes a femme sole as to her earnings, property and liberty-
Georgia also provides that the husband does not have to support the
wife, if the jury has provided for her sufficiently
" Minnesota gives
to the wife immediate possession of her real estate;' statutes in
North Carolina provide 'that when a limited divorce is granted the
rights of the husband to curtesy and the wife to dower are barred;'
Indiana makes a resumption of marital relations criminal, during
the period of the limited divorce." The statutes are so varied that a
thorough examination proves nothing concrete, except the fact that
modern limited divorce statutes do have a tendency to follow those
of absolute divorce. It is, of course, definitely established that the
right of cohabitation is lost. So, it is quite plausible to conclude from
this fact that the husband has lost his right to an action for
alienation of affections and also the right to an action for loss of
consortium since the actions are based in part on the right of co-
habitation. From these facts it would appear that the marital status
is so seriously affected that the action should be considered to be
in rem.
16 226 U.S. 551, 57 L. Ed. 347 (1913) 32 Sup. Ct. 127.
GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 2, Sec. 128.
"Ky. R. S. (1946) Sec. 403.050.
"12 ANN. CODE OF GA. (Parks, 1922) Sec. 2970.
102 MINN. ST. (1941) Sec. 518-19.
11 GEN. ST. OF N. C. (1943) Ch. 52-20, 52-21.
S2 IND. ST. ANN (Burns, 1933) Sec. 3-1234.
STUDENT NOTES AND COMMENTS
In conclusion the answer to the problem is one of addition
rather than one of evaluation. It seems that where most of the mar-
riage ties are preserved except for the suspension of cohabitation
which may be resumed upon reconciliation, the action is without
doubt in personam, in jurisdictions where a great many of the mar-
riage ties are destroyed and the causes and proceedings are the same
as in absolute divorce it is logical to say that the action is n rem.
If the action had remained of as little effect as originally then it
would without doubt be an action n personam. However, addition
of the effects by modern statute to the marriage status categorizes
the action as one rn rem. This is probably the most desirable place
for limited divorce in modern law since the historical fear of de-
stroying the marriage ties is rapidly decreasing as evidenced by our
increased absolute divorce rate. It is evident that as the limited
divorce parallels the action of absolute divorce it becomes more and
more an action rn rem. It is reasonable to suppose that judicial
separation will soon duplicate absolute divorce in such a way that it
will no longer be needed in the law as a separate action.
The marital status is certainly more than the mere legal rela-
tionship of the husband and wife. The personal rights of consortium
disappear with the enforced suspension of cohabitation. It is indeed
arguable that the destruction of the right to cohabitation alone has
such a dire effect on the marital status that fundamentally the mar-
riage fails to exist. We find under modern statutes that most 6f the
property rights such as dower, curtesy and right to support are
either seriously affected or completely destroyed. It is evident that
the duty the parties have to each other not to remarry is too shallow
a link to give to it alone the strength to perpetuate the marriage
status. Since the modern limited divorce statutes do so much to de-
stroy the marriage, it is reasonable to say that the status is affected
in such a way as to place the action in the m rem category.
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